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BOLSTERING THE FOUNDATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
DECLARES EQUITABLE TOLLING NOW APPLIES TO THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT  
By 
Matthew E. Selmasska* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the Federal Arbitration Act, 
(“FAA”).1 The Court further held that Move, Inc. (“Move”) did not receive a 
fundamentally fair arbitration hearing because a non-attorney who falsified his 
credentials chaired the arbitration panel.2 The court reasoned that none of the textual 
factors set out by the Supreme Court in Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), which 
are used to determine whether the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply to a statute, 
weighed against applying equitable tolling to the FAA.3 The court also stated that the 
structure of the FAA is compatible with equitable tolling, and that equitable tolling would 
not undermine the FAA’s basic purpose.4 Furthermore, the court held that by falsifying 
his credentials and lying to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the 
very presence of the chairman of the three-member arbitration panel denied Move a 
fundamentally fair hearing.5 As such, the court declared that Move was entitled to vacatur 
of the arbitration award under § 10(a)(3) of the FAA.6 This decision is significant 
because the Ninth Circuit is only the second federal circuit to answer this question in the 
affirmative.7 Additionally, because multiple federal circuits have avoided answering this 
question,8 this decision could represent a bold shift in momentum favoring equitable 
tolling with respect to the FAA. While the decision potentially broadens the scope of 
Section 12 of the FAA and its three-month challenge requirement,9 the decision 
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1 Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 840 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2016); 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. 
 
2 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1159. 
 
3 Id. at 1157. 
 
4 Id. 
 
5 Id. at 1158. 
 
6 Id. at 1159. 
 
7 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156. 
 
8 Id. 
 
9 “Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or his 
attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered.” 9 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. 
 
 nevertheless bolsters the foundation of fundamental fairness upon which the U.S. law of 
arbitration rests. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
  
 Move operates the Move Network of real estate websites for consumers and real 
estate professionals, and maintained an investment account with Defendant Citigroup 
Global Markets, Inc. (“Citigroup”).10 Regarding its investments with Citigroup, Move 
entered into a Client Agreement with Citigroup, which contained an effective arbitration 
clause.11 The Client Agreement stated “that ‘all claims or controversies [between the 
parties arising out of this Agreement] shall be determined by arbitration before, and only 
before, any self-regulatory organization or exchange of which Citigroup is a member.’”12 
In September of 2008, Move alleged that Citigroup mismanaged approximately $131 
million of its funds by investing in speculative auction rate securities.13 Thus, Move 
initiated arbitration proceedings against Citigroup before a three-member panel of 
FINRA.14  
 Prior to the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, FINRA required Move 
and Citigroup to sign a Uniform Submission Agreement.15 The Uniform Submission 
Agreement stated that the dispute between the parties would be submitted to arbitration 
“in accordance with the Constitution, By-Laws, Rules, Regulations, and/or Code of 
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes,” which is embedded in FINRA Rules 
12000-12905.16 FINRA’s Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes includes 
Rule 12401(c), which required Move’s claims to be arbitrated by a panel of three FINRA 
arbitrators.17 In accordance with Rule 12403, FINRA furnished to both Move and 
Citigroup a list of thirty proposed arbitrators, which contained employment histories for 
each prospective arbitrator on the list.18 FINRA also provided both parties with a shorter 
list of ten proposed arbitrators from its chairperson roster.19 It was paramount to Move 
                                                        
10 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1154.  
 
11 Id. 
 
12 Id. 
 
13 Id. 
 
14 Id. 
 
15 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1154. 
 
16 Id. 
 
17 Id. at 1154-55.  
 
18 Id. 
 
19 Id. at 1155.  
 
 that the chairperson selected be an experienced attorney, particularly because this dispute 
involved a complex securities issue.20 
 Among the list of names on the FINRA chairperson roster was James H. Frank, 
who, according to an accompanying disclosure report, received a law degree in 1975 
from Southwestern University and was licensed to practice law in New York, California, 
and Florida.21 Move indicated that Mr. Frank was its top choice to chair the three-
member arbitration panel.22 Pursuant to certain rules and regulations of FINRA, 
prospective arbitrators on the lists must affirm that the information on their Arbitrator 
Disclosure Report is accurate and up to date.23 Pursuant to FINRA policies, all 
prospective arbitrators know that the failure to disclose material information in the 
Arbitrator Disclosure Report and arbitrator profile may result in their permanent 
disqualification.24 The arbitration panel to decide the parties’ dispute was ultimately 
comprised of Mr. Frank as chairperson, Arthur T. Berggren, who was a licensed attorney, 
and Daniel R. Brush, a Certified Public Accountant and Certified Financial Planner.25 
The entire arbitration of the dispute consisted of six pre-hearing conferences and twenty 
hearing sessions.26 Ultimately, on December 8, 2009, the three-member panel issued a 
unanimous award in favor of Citigroup and denied Move’s claims.27 
 Over four years after the rendition of the arbitral award, in March of 2014, Move 
discovered an article in The AmLaw Litigation Daily, which detailed how Mr. Frank had 
falsified his credentials with FINRA and lied about being a licensed attorney.28 Mr. 
Frank’s full name is “James Hamilton Hardy Frank,” and he successfully impersonated a 
retired California attorney by the name of “James Hamilton Frank.”29 Thereafter, FINRA 
confirmed that Mr. Frank falsified his information on the Arbitrator Disclosure Report, 
and lied about his qualifications.30 FINRA subsequently removed him from all existing 
cases and from their roster.31 
                                                        
20 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1155. 
 
21 Id. 
 
22 Id. 
 
23 Id. 
 
24 Id. 
 
25 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1155. 
 
26 Id. 
 
27 Id.  
 
28 Id. 
 
29 Id. 
 
30 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1155. 
 
31 Id. 
 
  In June of 2014, Move filed a complaint and a motion for vacatur in the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing that vacatur of the 
arbitration award was warranted under Sections 10(a)(3) and 10(a)(4) of the FAA due to 
Mr. Frank’s misrepresentations.32 While Section 12 of the FAA mandates that a notice of 
motion to vacate an arbitration award must be served no later than three months after an 
award is rendered, given the circumstances here, Move argued that the statutory deadline 
should be equitably tolled.33 Citigroup responded to the motion by filing a motion to 
dismiss, and argued that equitable tolling was not available under the FAA, and even if it 
were, Move failed to demonstrate that equitable tolling was justified on the merits.34 The 
district court granted Citigroup’s motion and denied Move’s motion to vacate.35 
Specifically, the court ruled that equitable tolling did apply to the FAA, but Move 
nonetheless failed to demonstrate an adequate ground for vacatur under the FAA.36 The 
district court further summarized that: 
 
Mr. Frank’s misbehavior did not prejudice Move’s rights to a 
fundamentally fair hearing as required by § 10(a)(3) [of the FAA]; and the 
panel did not exceed its powers in violation of § 10(a)(4) because Mr. 
Frank’s deceit, if cognizable at all under that section, did not violate 
Move’s contractual rights under its Client Agreement with Citigroup.37 
 
Move then timely appealed the district court’s ruling.38 
 
 
III. COURT’S ANALYSIS 
 
 The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by declaring the de novo standard of review it 
uses in reviewing a district court’s refusal to vacate an award.39 The Ninth Circuit also 
uses a de novo standard of review in hearing an appeal of a district court dismissing a 
complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).40 
                                                        
32 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1155. 
 
33 Id. Equitable tolling is a legal doctrine by which the statute of limitations is paused, or “tolled.” It is 
employed primarily “when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance 
prevents him from bringing a timely action[.]” See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S.Ct. 1224, 1231-32 
(2014). 
 
34 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1155. 
 
35 Id. 
 
36 Id. 
 
37 Id. 
 
38 Id. 
 
39 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1155. 
 
40 Id. 
 The Court then reiterated that Section 12 of the FAA requires that a motion to vacate an 
arbitration award be served within three months after the award is either filed or 
delivered.41 Due to the fact that Move’s motion was filed over four years after the Section 
12 statutory window had closed, the first question the Ninth Circuit had to address was 
whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the FAA.42 
 
 
A. The Three-Month Statutory Period to Challenge an Arbitration Award in 
Section 12 of the FAA May be Equitably Tolled.  
 
 The question of whether equitable tolling applies to the FAA was one of first 
impression for the Ninth Circuit.43 Unfortunately, the case law from other circuits on this 
issue was conflicting and split, with most circuit courts of appeal declining to definitively 
rule one way or the other with regard to whether equitable tolling is applicable to the 
FAA.44 The Ninth Circuit immediately invoked the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Young v. United States, in which the Court stated, “It is hornbook law that limitations 
periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling . . . unless tolling would be 
inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute.”45 Accordingly, the Court explained that, 
presumably, Congress drafts these statutory limitations in light of that overarching 
principle.46 Furthermore, the Court stated that a “rebuttable presumption that limitations 
                                                        
41 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156. 
 
42 Id. 
 
43 Id. The Ninth Circuit did note that the closest the court came to deciding this question came in Lafarge 
Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986). In Lafarge, 
the Court was presented with the question of whether a party could “revive an unsuccessful motion to 
vacate an arbitration award ‘by way of a Rule 60(b) motion with a claim of newly discovered evidence.’” 
Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156. The Court declined to rule in the affirmative and stated that, “the three-
month notice requirement of Section 12 . . . would be meaningless if a party to the arbitration proceeding 
could bring an independent action asserting such claims outside of the statutory time period provided in 
Section 12.” Id. (emphasis in original). Most importantly, equitable tolling was neither raised nor 
specifically discussed in Lafarge. Id. 
 
44 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156. The Ninth Circuit declined to decide this issue in Garrett v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1993), where the petitioner asked the court to accept 
his late petition pursuant to the doctrine of equitable tolling. Because the Ninth Circuit found that the 
district court correctly dismissed the action on a jurisdictional basis, it never reached the issue. Id. 
Additionally, the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Eighth Circuit have all declined to decide 
whether equitable tolling applies under the FAA. See Fradella v. Petricca, 183 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225-26 (4th Cir. 1986); Piccolo v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 641 F.2d 
598, 601 (8th Cir. 1981). The Tenth Circuit decided that equitable tolling would suspend the running of a 
statute of limitations period if Congress did not provide to the contrary. Pfannenstiel v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 447 F.3d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 2007). Lastly, the Fifth Circuit explicitly held that 
equitable tolling does apply to the FAA. See Cigna Ins. Co. v. Huddleston, No. 92-1252, 1993 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 40575 at *11 (5th Cir. 1993).  
 
45 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, at 49 (2002)).  
 
46 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Young, 535 U.S. at 49-50). 
 periods are subject to equitable tolling must be overcome by the text or purpose of the 
statute.”47 
 Put another way, federal statutes of limitations are typically “subject to a 
‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling[,]’” and the Supreme Court has 
instructed lower courts to apply multiple textual factors to federal statutes in order to 
determine whether equitable tolling should be precluded.48 These factors include: 
whether the limitations period is established in “unusually emphatic form;” is “unusually 
generous;” whether it uses “highly detailed” and “technical language;” and “whether the 
statute reiterated the limitations period several times in several different ways.”49 Because 
equitable tolling is an equitable remedy, a court typically will not construe any statute to 
“displace courts’ traditional equitable authority absent the clearest command[,]” so 
satisfaction of one or more of these factors could prevent the application of equitable 
tolling.50 The Ninth Circuit was convinced that none of these Holland factors weighed in 
favor of precluding the application of equitable tolling to the FAA.51 As the Court 
explained, “. . . the FAA’s instruction that notice of a motion to vacate ‘must be served’ 
within three months is neither ‘unusually generous’ nor ‘unusually emphatic.’”52 
Furthermore, the FAA’s limitations period is neither detailed nor technical and is not 
reiterated elsewhere in the statute. Accordingly, the text of the statute does not preclude 
equitable tolling.53 
 Citigroup made an unsuccessful comparison to Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, 
and argued that the instant action should be governed by that U.S. Supreme Court 
decision. There, the Court explained that Section 9 of the FAA, which commands that a 
court “must grant” a motion to confirm an arbitral award within one year after the award 
is made, “carries no hint of flexibility.”54 This argument ultimately failed, however, 
because equitable tolling was not at issue in Hall Street Associates.55 There, the issue was 
whether a court possessed the discretion to set aside an award on any grounds not 
enumerated in Sections 10 or 11 of the FAA.56 
                                                        
47 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156-57 (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 at 95-96 
(1990); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 at 138 (2008)).  
 
48 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1157; Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). 
 
49 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1157 (citing Holland, 560 U.S. at 646-47). 
 
50 Holland, 560 U.S. at 646. 
 
51 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1157. 
 
52 Id. 
 
53 Id. 
 
54 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1157 n.1. 
 
55 Id. at 1157. 
 
56 Id. 
 
  Next, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the structure of the FAA would not be 
upset by the doctrine of equitable tolling.57 Citigroup again argued unsuccessfully that 
because of Section 9’s “one year” provision, allowing a court to vacate an award beyond 
one year would upset the entire statutory scheme of the FAA.58 The Ninth Circuit was 
unconvinced, and instead stated that, “a moving party would still need to meet the heavy 
burden of establishing its entitlement to equitable tolling for a court to vacate an award, 
and it would only be the rare case in which the three-month deadline for a motion to 
vacate would not apply.”59 
 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit explained that equitable tolling would not undermine the 
basic purpose of the FAA.60 The Court reiterated that while the FAA supports the 
“emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration”61 and provides for very limited review, that 
pro-arbitration policy rests upon the assumption of a fair forum.62 The Court explicitly 
stated that there “cannot [be] special deference to arbitration outcomes in the face of a 
colorable claim that the forum was unfair in a particular case.”63 Therefore, in balancing 
both the finality of arbitration awards and concerns for due process, the Court insisted 
that arbitration would not be harmed if parties are permitted to reach the “high bar of 
equitable tolling in limited circumstances.”64 Thus, holding that equitable tolling applies 
to the FAA, the Ninth Circuit then had to decide the merits of Move’s motion for vacatur 
to see whether significant grounds existed per Section 10(a)(3).65 
 
 
B. Move, Inc. Entitled to Vacatur Under §10(a)(3) of the FAA 
 
 The Ninth Circuit declared that Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA enables courts to 
“vacate an arbitration award upon finding that ‘the arbitrators were guilty of . . . any . . . 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.”66 The Court 
simply could not accept the district court’s conclusion that Move’s rights were not 
prejudiced by the arbitrator’s fraudulent misrepresentations. The question asked in 
                                                        
57 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1157.  
 
58 Id. 
 
59 Id. 
 
60 Id. 
 
61 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985). 
 
62 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1157-58. 
 
63 Id. at 1158.  
 
64 Id.  
 
65 Id.  
 
66 Id.  
 
 determining whether an arbitrator’s misbehavior adversely impacted the rights of the 
arbitrating parties was whether those parties received a fundamentally fair hearing.67 The 
Court stated that vacatur of an arbitral award could be proper where an arbitrator received 
ex parte evidence that influenced the result of the arbitration proceedings, or “where an 
arbitrator’s post-hearing consultation with an outside expert ‘tainted’ the panel’s 
decision.”68 While the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that there had never been a similar 
factual situation to the instant case, where an arbitrator’s selection was based upon his 
lies and deceit, the Court concluded that such behavior is sufficient for vacatur under 
Section 10(a)(3) and that Move was denied a fundamentally fair hearing.69 
 The Court articulated how important it was for Move to receive an actual attorney 
to chair the arbitration panel, given that the claim involved a complex securities issue.70 
In fact, Move had disqualified many potential attorneys from the proposed FINRA list 
because it wanted a highly experienced chairperson.71 Relying on Mr. Frank’s falsified 
background information, Move ranked him first on the FINRA candidate list.72 Citigroup 
argued that Mr. Frank’s inclusion on the arbitration panel did not necessarily mean that 
Move’s rights were prejudiced.73 Citigroup further argued that there was no evidence that 
Mr. Frank’s participation affected the ultimate outcome of the arbitral proceedings.74 
However, the Ninth Circuit declared that there was simply no way to know whether 
prejudice had occurred.75 The Court stated, “Particularly on a small board, . . . it is 
difficult if not impossible to measure the impact that one member’s views have on the 
process of collective deliberation. Each member contributes not only his vote but his 
voice to the deliberative process.”76 
 The Court then revealed that under FINRA’s own policies, the deceit that Mr. 
Frank perpetuated would have resulted in his permanent disqualification from serving as 
a FINRA arbitrator, and that he was indeed banished from the FINRA roster upon the 
                                                        
67 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1158; U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat. Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1177 (9th Cir. 
2010).  
 
68 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1158 (citing Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. N. Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 
649, 653 (5th Cir. 1979); M&A Elec. Power Co-op. v. Local Union No. 702, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 
AFL-CIO, 977 F.2d 1235, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1992)). 
 
69 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1158. 
 
70 Id. at 1158-59. 
 
71 Id. at 1159. 
 
72 Id.  
 
73 Id. 
 
74 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1159. 
 
75 Id. 
 
76 Id. (citing Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 747 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 
 revelation of his fraudulent misrepresentations.77 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Move’s rights were prejudiced by Mr. Frank’s participation, because Move was denied a 
fundamentally fair hearing.78 As such, the Court reiterated that Move was entitled to 
vacatur of the arbitration award under Section 10(a)(3).79 The Court then reversed the 
district court’s judgment in part and remanded the action to the district court for entry of 
judgment in favor of Move.80 
 On January 5, 2017, Citigroup petitioned the Ninth Circuit and sought a rehearing 
on the vacatur of its arbitration award.81 Citigroup argued that its “award should be 
reinstated because the panel’s allowance of equitable tolling to challenge awards beyond 
the three-month statutory window could open the floodgates for broad attacks against all 
arbitration awards . . . .”82 The Ninth Circuit panel was not convinced, however, and 
upheld its earlier decision vacating the award.83 
 
 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE 
 
 The Ninth Circuit’s holding represents an important change in the nature of 
challenging arbitration awards.84 Its decision in this action is the most definitive ruling on 
this issue from any federal circuit.85 As the Court discussed in the opinion, other federal 
circuit court rulings on this particular issue have been unharmonious and inconsistent.86 
Three federal circuits—the First, Fourth, and Eighth—have all explicitly declined to 
answer whether equitable tolling could be applied to the FAA.87 Before the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court 
                                                        
77 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1159. 
 
78 Id. 
 
79 Id. 
 
80 Id. 
 
81 Cara Mannion, 9th Circ. Stands By Citigroup Ruling Over Fake FINRA Atty, LAW 360 (Jan. 5, 2017),  
https://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/877936?utm_source= shared- 
articles&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=shared-articles. 
 
82 Id. 
 
83 Id. 
 
84 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156 (holding that FAA Section 12’s three-month challenge requirement is not 
absolute, in light of the application of equitable tolling). 
 
85 Id. (acknowledging the conflicting case law from other federal circuits on this issue).  
 
86 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156. 
 
87 Id. (citing Fradella v. Petricca, 183 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1991); Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225-26 
(4th Cir. 1986); Piccolo v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 641 F.2d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1991)). 
 
 of Appeals was the only federal circuit to answer the question in the affirmative.88 With 
two federal circuits now expressly answering this question in the affirmative, it appears 
that momentum may move nationally for federal courts to hold that the FAA is subject to 
equitable tolling, particularly in circumstances in which parties’ rights are prejudiced and 
are thus confronted with a lack of fundamental fairness. This momentum is also likely to 
move in favor of equitable tolling because no federal circuit has expressly refused to 
apply equitable tolling to the FAA, but rather just opted to decline to answer the question. 
More importantly, the decisions of those circuits to decline to answer the question of 
whether to equitably toll the statute of limitations in the FAA were rendered more than 
twenty-five years ago. Therefore, should the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits be 
presented with the specific question again, the national momentum would indeed compel 
a holding in the affirmative, depending on the factual scenario of a prospective case. 
 This decision also shows practitioners how federal circuit courts will approach the 
general question of applying equitable tolling to federal statutes.89 The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Young v. United States emerges as the clear starting point in analyzing how 
equitable tolling may apply to federal statutory limitation periods.90 As a general rule, the 
Supreme Court stated:  
 
This Court has permitted equitable tolling in situations ‘where the 
claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective 
pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been 
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing 
deadline to pass.’ We have acknowledged, however, that tolling might be 
appropriate in other cases . . . and this, we believe, is one.91 
 
 The Supreme Court made clear in Young that there is no limit to certain factual 
scenarios where equitable tolling could apply, so long as a party has been “induced or 
tricked by his adversary’s misconduct . . . .”92 Here though, it is important to note that 
Move’s relief did not ultimately spawn from its adversary’s misconduct, but from the 
misconduct of the arbitral chairperson himself.93 Therefore, practitioners should be on 
notice, especially those in the Ninth Circuit, that the liberal application of equitable 
tolling could be triggered with the presence of any substantial misconduct or fraud, 
irrespective of the origin of such misconduct.  
At the heart of the case was the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the misconduct 
by the imposter arbitrator prevented Move from participating in fundamentally fair 
                                                        
88 Cigna Ins. Co. v. Huddleston, No. 92-1252, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 40575 at *11 (5th Cir. 1993).  
 
89 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1156. 
 
90 See Young, 535 U.S. at 43. 
 
91 Id. at 50 (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)). 
 
92 Id. 
 
93 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1159. 
 proceedings.94 This decision makes clear that if fundamental fairness is implicated to the 
point where a party’s rights are prejudiced, courts will be encouraged to apply equitable 
tolling. Indeed, Move did nothing wrong, and were it not for the fortuitous disclosure of 
Mr. Frank’s fraud in a legal publication four years after the rendition of the award, Move 
may have never been apprised of the totality of the fraud. Thus, the Ninth Circuit heeded 
the Supreme Court’s most recent guidance to allow for equitable tolling in extraordinary 
circumstances. Judge Nelson wrote, “time bars in suits between private parties are 
presumptively subject to equitable tolling. That means a court usually may pause the 
running of a limitations statute in private litigation when a party ‘has pursued his rights 
diligently but some extraordinary circumstance’ prevents him from meeting a 
deadline.”95 
 
 
V. COMMENTARY 
 
 Even though this decision from the Ninth Circuit resulted in the broadening of the 
potential scope of Section 12 of the FAA—by allowing the statutory limitations to be 
equitably tolled—and ultimately led to the vacatur of the arbitral award, the decision 
nevertheless continues to support the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.96 It 
does so by bolstering the assumption of fundamental fairness, upon which that emphatic 
federal policy must rest.97 Indeed, if the foundation for the policy favoring arbitration did 
not rest upon a foundation that was just, equitable, and fundamentally fair, it would be 
akin to the foolish man building his house on the sand. It has long been recognized that “a 
foolish man . . . built his house on sand. The rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds 
blew and beat against that house, and it fell—and great was its fall!”98 The emphatic 
federal policy would not command respect nor due regard from either practitioners or 
courts were it not grounded in a foundation of fundamental fairness. If this policy 
favoring arbitration is to be sustained, it is paramount that its foundation remains 
uncompromised. Thus, principles of equity commanded the Ninth Circuit here to not only 
recognize the applicability of equitable tolling to Section 12 of the FAA, but also to 
acknowledge that the arbitrating party’s rights were unfairly prejudiced at the hands of 
the arbitrator-imposter. The Court’s bold decision here is proper, as it is an effort to guard 
and maintain the fundamentally fair foundation upon which the emphatic federal 
arbitration policy rests. Hence, the Ninth Circuit also showed that it was not afraid to use 
equitable measures to remedy the prejudiced rights of arbitrating parties. 
                                                        
94 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1159. 
 
95 United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 1630-31 (2015) (emphasis in original). 
 
96 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1157-58 (insisting that the federal pro-arbitration policy must rest upon 
fundamental fairness).  
 
97 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1157-58. 
 
98 Matthew 7:26-27. 
 
  The Ninth Circuit appropriately explained why Citigroup’s comparison of the 
instant case to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates was inapposite. 
Hall Street Associates cannot be used as a blunt instrument against disputes challenging 
the enforceability of arbitration awards. Rather, the Ninth Circuit reminds litigants that 
Hall Street Associates stands for the proposition that only the enumerated instances of 
vacatur in Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA are available to challenge the viability and 
enforceability of arbitration awards.99 The Court in Hall Street Associates was clear: 
 
Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see the three 
provisions, §§ 9-11, as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration 
with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential 
virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any other reading opens the 
door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal 
arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming 
judicial review process, and bring arbitration theory to grief in [the] 
postarbitration process.100 
 
 The Ninth’s Circuit’s decision in the instant case properly tracks the Supreme 
Court’s rationale for only providing review and possible vacatur of awards for the 
enumerated list of reasons set out in Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA. Not surprisingly, the 
egregious conduct of the parties’ chief arbitrator certainly was enough to rise to the level 
of fraud, corruption, and misconduct set out in Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA.101 This is 
good news. If the Court found that Move’s rights were not prejudiced by an arbitrator 
falsifying his credentials and lying about his identity, it is difficult to imagine what sort of 
greater egregious conduct would be necessary to trigger the protections of Section 
10(a)(3). While this was certainly a unique case, it provides practitioners with yet another 
example of instances likely to result in vacatur of an arbitral award.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 Move, Inc. was denied a fundamentally fair arbitration hearing because an 
imposter chaired the hearing.102 Unfortunately, the fraud did not surface until over four 
years after the rendering of the award, and Move was almost left with no relief to 
challenge the award.103 In light of the extraordinary circumstances of this case, the Ninth 
                                                        
99 See Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 
100 Id. at 588 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache T Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003); Ethyl 
Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 768 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
 
101 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1158. 
 
102 Id. at 1159. 
 
103 Id. at 1155, 1159.  
 
 Circuit rectified the fraud by the imposition of equitable tolling.104 The decision by the 
Ninth Circuit demonstrates the lengths federal courts of appeal are willing to go to in 
order to ensure that the arbitration process remains fundamentally fair, and that the rights 
of arbitrating parties are protected. The decision to apply equitable tolling to the FAA is 
precedential in the Ninth Circuit, and will likely lead to other federal circuits following 
suit if given a justified opportunity. Here, the application of equitable tolling serves to 
polish the veneer of the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration agreements and 
enforcement. It also ensures that the rights of arbitrating parties will not be hampered or 
trampled upon by an unchecked desire for confirmation at all costs.  
 
 
   
  
  
 
  
                                                        
104 Move, Inc., 840 F.3d at 1158. 
